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Deconstructing iurisdictio: the adventures of a legal category in the hands of humanist 
jurists. 
Guido Rossi, Edinburgh University* 
 
 
i. Prologue; ii. ὕβρις: the original sin; iii. φθόνος θεῶν: rightful chastisement; iv. νόστος: the journey of iurisdictio; v. 
in lieu of a conclusion: veritas vos liberabit? 
 
 
i. If we were to assess the historical importance of any strand of legal scholarship by its 
later influence, many great scholars would be utterly marginalised to the benefit of more 
fortunate ones. This is of course what we do all the time. It is easy. But it is also 
reassuring: we like to think that time works in a Darwinian sense. We tend to associate 
the ‘greatness’ of an author with his ‘payoff’, and measure such a ‘payoff’ on its impact 
on the development of the law. In principle, this of course has its merits. The problem 
is that we often start with our modern system. Since we look backwards, we measure 
with hindsight. This way we build a linear, majestic highway connecting past and 
present. Anything outside of it may be safely overlooked, for it does not lead to us. 
Moreover, in building our highway we can happily revise the past and straighten any 
curve - after all, when the road bends it goes in the wrong direction. This way, our 
functional approach leads not just to oversimplifications, but often straight to re-writing 
history. More than simplifying, it mystifies. As it happens, legal humanism is one of 
the best examples of all this. There is no doubt that sixteenth century is the Age of Legal 
Humanism. Any textbook on European Legal History would tell you that. 
We teach legal humanists – as we should – because of their alleged profound influence 
on the law. Perhaps the implied argument is that, if we were to question their actual 
influence, we might risk having to reconsider whether to teach them at all. And it is 
very comforting – and easy – to have a nice group of new figures occupying the 
sixteenth century. Otherwise one should seriously think of teaching the later ius 
commune, a subject which unfortunately lacks grand narratives and so is both difficult 
and terribly variegated from country to country. Whether those ‘new figures’ were 
effectively doing what we say they were, it is not really the point. They provide us with 
a superb new chapter, most useful (and timely) to break with Bartolism and make way 
for the institutional writers, and ultimately natural law.1  
That the mos italicus progressively declined (though at different times in different 
places) is of course true. What is arguable is whether the advent of legal humanism 
entailed a scission among jurists between mos italicus and mos gallicus. What exactly 
this mos gallicus may be is not easy to say. We use this label to group together any 
heterodoxy in respect of the mos italicus, and we move from the draconian principle 
'semel-semper'. If a writer does not behave as a Bartolist at any given time, his entire 
work must be considered part of legal humanism.2 
                                                        
* I am particularly grateful to John W. Cairns and Paul du Plessis for their advice and scrupulous editing 
of the script. 
1 The link between legal humanism and Elegant Jurisprudence tends to be less pronounced in most 
textbooks. This of course seems bizarre, but only at first sight. For Elegant Jurisprudence was yet another 
'wrong' bending of the road leading towards the Modern Truth.  
2 The opposite is of course also true: we can make sense of the later mos italicus as a unitary category 
only by sweeping generalisations. This has probably nurtured the Bartolists-Humanists divide nearly as 
much as the semel-semper principle. More deeply, it might have even contributed to its very creation.  
One of the most recent attempts to explain the interplay between mos italicus and mos gallicus speaks of 
'numerous variants and gradations' of the 'humanist dimension', and labels the middle ground between 
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As it is well known, the two main elements of legal humanism were history and 
philology. Legal humanism heralded, among other things, the birth of legal history in 
the modern sense of the term – namely, the study of the law (mostly Roman) from a 
historical perspective. But precisely because of this, it was hardly a turning point in 
legal history. The philological element could have entailed more profound 
repercussions, since it challenged the very foundations of the ius commune. By and 
large, however, the scope of those repercussions was such as to neutralise them. Strict 
adherence to ancient texts would have led to conclusions interesting for historians, but 
untenable for contemporary jurists. Legal history stemmed from legal humanism, but 
legal historians tend to be innocuous creatures in respect to the development of the law. 
Further, early legal humanists were often academics in the worst sense of the term, 
more inclined to quarrels than cooperation. The confusion and variety of different views 
on what the original text might have been was such that, rather than spreading a single 
voice, or a polyphonic harmony, it produced a loud cacophonic sound. Or at least this 
was what coeval jurists perceived.  
 
This contribution will focus on a small example of such legal humanists’ ‘voices’ and 
of their reception among Bartolists, the case of iurisdictio. It does not aim at 
completeness in the least. It is most definitely not an essay on the development of the 
concept of iurisdictio in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, and it lacks any 
pretence to guide the reader into the intricacies of the subject.3 The scope is narrower 
and the purpose more modest: describing the position of some legal humanists on a 
specific subject, observing the reaction of non-humanist jurists and perhaps glimpsing 
the ultimate reasons behind their contrast. This is a significant caveat, for the focus of 
these pages is not on legal humanist theories, but on their immediate impact. Further, 
such an impact should not be assessed in general terms. The influence of legal 
humanism on the work of Bartolist lawyers was extremely variegated (to say nothing 
of the universe behind the terms 'non-humanist' and 'Bartolist'). Any general account 
would necessarily result in a broad narration with scant truth in it. Rather, I will focus 
on few humanist jurists, mostly of the first half of the sixteenth century, chosen mainly 
because of their frequent quotation by other non-humanist lawyers on the subject. Also, 
although the choice of the subject is arbitrary, I believe that the same results could be 
reached with a different subject. The important point is that the topic is abstract enough 
to attract legal humanists’ attention but not entirely detached from reality, lest it would 
be ignored by non-humanist jurists. Iurisdictio simply fitted the bill. Lastly, although 
here we are on shakier ground, it offers another advantage, as its 'deconstruction' might 
betray some political intent.  
Two last points. The term 'iurisdictio' refers to the jurisdictional prerogatives of a judge, 
not to other subjects (e.g. territorial jurisdiction, state jurisdiction, etc.). Second, 
references to secondary sources are extremely limited. This is intentional. There are 
many modern excellent works touching on the subject, but very few devoted to it. 
                                                        
Bartolism and legal humanism as 'moderate humanism'. Beyond this threshold the Elegant Jurisprudence 
lies; behind it, we are still in the province of Bartolism. R. Lesaffer, European Legal History (trans. J. 
Arriens), Cambridge: University Press, 2009, p. 353-354.  
3 For more exhaustive works on the subject see first of all the seminal study of M.P. Gilmore, Argument 
from Roman law in political thought, 1200-1600, Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1941, 
esp. p. 77-85, and more recently the important contribution of L. Mannori, Per una 'preistoria' della 
funzione amministrativa. Cultura giuridica e attività dei pubblici apparati nell'età del tardo diritto 
comune, in Quaderni Fiorentini per la Storia del Pensiero Giuridico, 19 (1990), p. 323-504, esp. p. 345-
407. To some extent, despite the somewhat different perspective, the present paper is meant as a gloss 
on Mannori's remarkable study. 
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Several studies mention some of the issues related to our subject while looking at other 
subjects. Pointing at them might have risked shifting the focus of these pages. 
 
 
ii. Early modern public law evolved rapidly. But it did not move away from its medieval 
framework. Rather, it built on it. The whole administrative structure of the early modern 
state was still rooted in the medieval concept of iurisdictio. In a paradox of history, the 
modern idea of iurisdictio is probably closer to the Roman than the medieval one. It is 
well known that the medieval concept of iurisdictio derives from the conflation of two 
distinct categories, iuris-dictio (to 'say' the law) and iuris-ditio (the 'power' of the law).4 
Of the two concepts, medieval jurists considered that of iuris-ditio to be the general 
one. As such, the general concept of iurisdictio did not have a jurisdictional meaning, 
but it simply meant ‘authority’.5 In turn, this general potestas was divided in two 
categories: jurisdictional power on the one hand, and any other power (we would say, 
both administrative and legislative functions) on the other. Jurisdictional power was 
termed ‘iurisdicito simplex’,6 while the other category ‘imperium’.7 Imperium was in 
turn separated into merum and mixtum.8 The distinction was based on their different 
aim: imperium merum was concerned with public utility; when on the contrary the 
utility was mainly private, the imperium was mixtum.9 Further, imperium - both merum 
and mixtum - and iurisdictio simplex were each fragmented into six levels, so that, for 
                                                        
4 C. Fasolt, The Limits of History (Chicago: University Press, 2004), p. 178-185; B. Paradisi, Il pensiero 
politico dei giuristi medievali, in L. Firpo (ed.), Storia delle idee politiche economiche e sociali (Torino: 
Utet, 1983), vol. II, pt. 2, p. 273-275. 
5 Accursius, Digestum vetus, Parisiis, apud Gulielmum Merlin, 1566, vol. I, ad Dig. 2.1.3, col. 164, § 
Mixtum est; Bartolus de Sassoferrato, Super prima et secunda parte Digesti veteris, Basileae, ex Officina 
Frobeniana, per Hieronymum Frobenium, et Nicol. Episcopium, 1562, ad Dig. 2.1.3, p. 112, § Imperium, 
n. 3-4: ‘qu[a]ero unde dicatur iurisdictio? dicit glossa hic quod dicitur a dictione quod est potestas et 
iuris quasi iuris potestas [...] nam potestas et iurisdictio idem sunt, ut dixi: et est potestas iuris, ergo est 
iurisdictio.’ See also Azo, Summa codicis, Basileæ, per I. Heruagium, 1563, ad C.3.13, § Quoniam, col. 
183, n. 1: 'dicitur autem iurisdictio a ditione (quod est potestas) et iure, quasi dicat, legitima potestas’. 
6 Bartolus de Sassoferrato, Super prima et secunda parte Digesti veteris, cit., ad Dig. 2.1.1, § Ius dicentis, 
n. 2, p. 107. 
7  Ibid.: ‘Ius dicere potest etiam ubi nullum est litigium, ut quando interponitur decretum, super 
alienatione rerum minorum, vel super transactione alimentorum, quae sunt misti imperii’ (mistus was a 
medieval corruption for mixtus). It follows that iudicium dicere is not coterminous with ius dicere. While 
the former denotes iurisdictio simplex, the latter is the expression of imperium. See ibid., n. 1: 'venio ad 
quod et primo ad ea quae tanguntur in gl. et quaero quare dicit ius dicentis, et non iudicis dicentis? 
Respond[e]o gl. hoc ideo quia non de omni iudice, sed tantum de eo qui habet merum et mixtum 
imperium’. For this reason Bartolus stresses the importance, in the Liber Extra, of the term ’ius dicere’ 
to designate the chief prerogative of the iudex. See ibid., n. 4: 'nam idem est dicere iudex, quod ius dicens, 
extra de ver. sig. c. forum [X.5.10: 'iudex dictus quasi ius dicens populo’] quod placet, quia hic 
sincopatur, quia detrahitur litera: scilicet de medio. Item quia appellatio iudicis refertur ad [iudices] 
maiores [...] Et ideo dicitur [ius] dicentis, et non iudicis, quia sic placuit sibi.’ Cf. Azo, Summa Codicis, 
cit., ad C.3.13, § Quoniam, n. 20, col. 187: ‘quod non dixit officium iudicis, sed officium ius dicentis’. 
8 Bartolus de Sassoferrato, Super prima et secunda parte Digesti veteris, cit., ad Dig. 2.1.3, § Imperium, 
n. 4, p. 112: ‘iurisdictio in genere sumpta, dividitur in dua species, scilicet in imperium simpliciter 
sumptum, et in specie quod est iurisdictio [...] nam potestas et iurisdictio idem sunt, ut dixi: et est potestas 
iuris, ergo est iurisdictio. Idem de mero et mixtum imperio [...] cui etiam iurisdictio inest, sicut genus 
inest speciei suae [...] Est ergo iurisdictio genus. [...] imperium subdividitur in merum, et mistum. Non 
enim iurisdictio dividitur in merum et mixtum imperium, sed imperium simpliciter sumptum dividitur in 
merum et mixtum.’ See further ibid., n. 7-13 and n. 14-22, p. 112-113, on merum and mixtum imperium 
respectively. 
9 Ibid., n. 6. Cf. also ibid., n. 15, p. 113. 
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instance, merum imperium ranged from the power to enact general laws to that of 
imposing a modest fine.10 
This complex system was based on two pillars. First, there was no clear-cut conceptual 
distinction between iurisdictio and imperium. They formed a single and unitary 
category in which jurisdictional prerogatives were but a part of a more general power 
of government.11 Second, and crucially, the different kinds and degrees of jurisdiction 
were not to be distinguished according to the functions of the magistrate or the 
territorial extension of his jurisdiction, but rather according to the personal status of the 
iudex,12 so that the first and foremost division was that between iudex nobilis and iudex 
mercenarius. 13 Unlike the iudex mercenarius, the iudex nobilis did not need a lawsuit 
to exercise his jurisdiction. Ultimately, the distinction between iurisdictio simplex and 
imperium did not lie in their specific characteristics, but in the status of the iudex who 
exercised them. 
 
 
iii. Even from such a short survey it should be clear that the medieval understanding of 
iurisdictio was hardly faithful to the Roman sources. Unsurprisingly enough, the first 
jurist to insist on the point was Andreas Alciatus (Andrea Alciato, 1492-1550). In the 
second book of his Paradoxa, Alciatus methodically demolished the ius commune 
concept of iurisdictio. There is nothing in the sources to justify the idea of iurisdictio 
as a broad and all-encompassing genus. Merum imperium hardly designs a general, all-
encompassing power. The sources speak of 'merum' in the restrictive sense of 'solum' - 
and not 'absolute' and 'unbounded', as the Civilians would have it. When imperium is 
merum, it has no iurisdictio. Deprived of any jurisdictional prerogative, merum 
imperium is just the 'potestas animadvertendi in facinorosos homines' (D.2.1.3), that is, 
the power to inflict a punishment.14 Since Ulpian speaks of a gladii potestas, this 
punishment must refer only to criminal proceedings. Clearly, it has nothing in common 
with the jurisdictional sphere - iurisdictio.15 Not only, therefore, do extra-jurisdictional 
powers ('ditio') have hardly any similarity at all with iurisdictio, but they are not even 
included in merum imperium. Correctly understood, merum imperium is but a 
magistrate's prerogative, not the supreme power reserved to the prince alone.16 In turn, 
                                                        
10 Ibid, n. 8-12, 17-22 and 24-26, p. 112-114 (on imperium merum, imperium mixtum and iurisdictio 
simplex respectively). This six-fold division meant that not even the whole of iurisdictio (simplex) was 
entrusted to the iudex mercenarius: ibid., n. 24, p. 113. 
11 See the classic works of P.N. Riesenberg, Inalienability of Sovereignty in Medieval Political Thought 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), p. 35, and of F. Calasso I glossatori e la teoria della 
sovranità (Milano: Giuffrè, 1957), p. 49. 
12 Bartolus de Sassoferrato, Super prima et secunda parte Digesti veteris, cit., ad Dig. 2.1.3, § Imperium, 
n. 15-16, p. 113. 
13 Ibid., ad Dig. 2.1.1, § Ius dicentis, n. 12, p. 108-109: ‘officium nobile est quod per se stat sive hoc 
iudex suo motu exerceat. sive ad postulationem alterius [...] Quoddam est officium mercenarium quod 
per se non stat. sed deservit actioni’. 
14 Andreas Alciatus, Paradoxorum ad Pratum libri sex, Mediol[ani], Alexander Minutianis, 1518, lib. 2, 
ch. 6, fol. 17r: ‘merum imperium nil aliud esse, quam potestatem gladio animadvertendi in facinorosos 
homines: et haec definitio cum re definita convertitur: quamobrem iure civili valere eam, negandum non 
est. [...] gladius hic non simpliciter pro telo accipi debet, sed pro quacunque poena, qua ex delicto 
plectendus sit reus'. Cf. also ibid., lib. 2, ch. 7, fol. 17v. 
15 Ibid., lib. 2, ch. 8, fol. 17v: 'imperium aut merum, aut mixtum est. Merum imperium est habere gladii 
potestatem ad animadvertendum in facinorosos homines. Mixtum est cui etiam iurisdictio inest, quod in 
danda bonorum possessione consistit. Iurisdictio est etiam iudicis dandi licentia'. 
16 Ibid., lib. 2, ch. 6, fol. 17r: ‘si merum imperium nil aliud est, quam potestatem animadvertendi in 
facinorosos homines habere, certe haec potestas magistratibus tribuitur: quo circa et merum imperium 
habere dicendum est.'  
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the sources are quite clear in that mixtum imperium consists of bonorum possessio and 
of iudicis dandi licentia.17 The entire distinction so dear to Civilians between iudex 
nobilis and mercenarius, and ultimately between public and private utility, is therefore 
completely groundless. 18  For instance, condemnation and absolution alike are 
principally aimed at public utility. But if merum imperium had the monopoly of all 
actions primarily inspired by public utility, then we should conclude that absolution 
would fall within merum imperium too. And this is not what the sources tell us. In short, 
the whole understanding of the Civilians, 'who followed Bartolus as a prince of the 
Legal Republic',19 was seriously flawed.  
Alciatus' Paradoxa heralded the offensive. And yet his triumph was partial. Almost by 
default, among humanist jurists the pars destruens of an author's argument was 
considerably more successful than his pars construens. While most legal humanists 
agreed on what iurisdictio and imperium were not,20 no such consensus was reached on 
what they actually were. The reconstruction proposed by Alciatus was successful 
mainly in its repudiation of the old scheme, but not in replacing it with a new one.21 
 
Having duly deconstructed the Civilians' concept of iurisdictio, the problem was how 
to put its pieces together. Merum imperium was particularly problematic, and to some 
extent representative of the legal humanists’ approach, as it triggered endless learned 
disputes. Humanist jurists proved considerably more apt at digging into the texts than 
building on them. The main points on which, by and large, many of them tended to 
                                                        
17 Ibid., lib. 2, ch. 8, fol. 17v. Space limits do not allow forays into the intricacies of the subject and most 
of all on the manifold interpretations of 'iudicis dandi licentia'. The issue of iurisdictio delegata gave 
rise to endless and very complex controversies on its meaning and - moreover - scope. Thankfully, 
however, such controversies did not create new interpretations of imperium but rather depended on it. 
We will return to the point in the conclusion.   
18 Ibid., lib. 2, ch. 7, fol. 17v. 
19 Ibid., 'quem, uti legalis reipublicae principem alii sequuntur'. 
20 An obvious exception must be made for Ulrichus Zasius (Huldrych Zäsi, 1461-1536). On our subject, 
Zasius was a strict adherent to the Bartolian orthodoxy, the main addition being solely a more punctual 
reference to the textual sources than the average Civilian. Nowhere he detached himself from the 
Bartolian reading of jurisdiction (at the most reporting some variations proposed by Baldus). In his work 
both definitions and scope of iurisdictio, mixtum and merum imperium are perfectly adhering to the 
Bartolian lectura, together with the distinction between publica and privata utilitas and between iudex 
nobilis and mercenarius, as well as with delegata iurisdictio. Zasius' work on iurisdictio and imperium 
may be found in his comment to De iurisdictione omnium iudicum (In sequentes ff. veteris titulos lecturae 
nempe de iustitia et iure, de legibus, de iurisdictione omnium iud., Basileae 1537, p. 101-126), and in his 
Paratitla to the first part of Digestum vetus (In primam Digestorum Partem Paratitla, Basileae, apud 
Mich. Ising, 1539, ad D.2.1, p. 34-39). The first of the two works is particularly detailed on iurisdictio 
delegata (ad D.2.1.4-5, p. 111-126), a subject which on the contrary would receive just scant attention 
in the Paratitla. Zasius' work on our subject received great attention - especially by non-humanist jurists. 
No Civilian had any problem in quoting him approvingly or in relying on his interpretation. Zasius was 
by far the 'legal humanist' most frequently quoted by later Bartolists. On Zasius' alleged humanistic 
approach see S. Rowan, Ulrich Zasius. A Jurist in the German Renaissance, 1461-1535 (Frankfurt am 
Main: Klostermann, 1987), p. 93-96, 105-108 and esp. 206-209. 
21 Alciatus followed a three-fold division based on actio, persecutio and accusatio to explain iurisdictio, 
mixtum and merum imperium respectively. Alciatus, De Verborum Significatione Libri Quat[t]uor, 
Ludgunum, Seb. Gryphius, 1530, ad D.50.16.178.2, § Actionis, p. 219-220; ad D.50.16.9, § 
Persecutione, p. 109; ad D.50.16.197, § Indicasse, p. 232 respectively. See also (but on a smaller extent) 
his Paradoxorum ad Pratum libri sex, cit., lib. 2, ch. 10-11, fols. 18r-19r. In particular, the least 
successful element of Alciatus' three-fold division was probably the explanation of mixtum imperium as 
persecutio, chiefly because leading to an autonomous category rather than to an intermediate one 
between iurisdictio and merum imperium. As it will become apparent in the next few pages, it was 
precisely the closeness between iurisdictio and mixtum imperium what attracted most humanist jurists 
(and so possibly made Alciatus' scheme less appealing).  
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agree were two. First, as the modica coercio of mixtum imperium is instrumental to ius 
dicere, iurisdictio and mixtum imperium are deeply related, and hardly separable from 
each other. Second, merum imperium is fully separated from mixtum imperium and 
iurisdictio. And this was precisely the problem. Merum imperium is described in the 
sources as animadversio in facinorosos homines. Hence, most legal humanists 
considered it as the executio of the judgment in criminal cases. But if the executio is 
entrusted to the magistrate with merum imperium, and merum imperium is wholly 
detached from iurisdictio, it follows that such a magistrate may not have any cognitio 
of the subject matter. In short, the magistrate empowered to give execution to the 
judgment could not also hear the dispute, and vice versa. 
 
This conclusion was already implicit in one of the first French legal humanists who 
followed Alciatus, Ioannis Longovallius (Jean Longueval). But Longovallius did not 
bring Alciatus' argument to its ultimate consequences.22 The honour belongs to Ioannis 
Gillotus (Jean Gillot).23 Gillotus sharply divided the legal proceeding in three phases: 
cognitio, sententia, and executio. As with Alciatus and Longovallius, and perhaps even 
more than either of them, in Gillotus mixtum imperium encompassed almost any 
judicial prerogative.24 While cognitio and sententia pertain to iurisdictio and mixtum 
imperium, executio is the province of merum imperium. Executio is wholly detached 
from the legal proceeding because it is only concerned with executing the judgment 
(‘sententiae effectus’). Once the decision is rendered, the controversy is over. This way, 
the magistrate with mixtum imperium enjoys full iurisdictio over the dispute while at 
the same time the distinction between mixtum and merum imperium is maintained.25  
In Gillotus, the prerogatives of the ordinary (or delegated) judge were consistent with 
the sources and so surely correct. But the problem remained in respect to the magistrate 
with merum imperium: he would have to execute someone else's judgment without 
being able to look at it. Lacking any cognitio, he would resemble more an executioner 
than a magistrate. The problem was particularly thorny in case new evidence emerged 
after the jurisdictional phase. Gillotus sought to solve the problem by restricting the 
divide between merum and mixtum imperium. To this end he resorted to the old 
(Civilian) stratagem of dividing a legal category in a broad and general sense and a 
narrow and specific one. So, Gillotus argued, when specifically referred to criminal 
cases merum imperium is to be understood in its narrow meaning - merum as 'only': 
only imperium, without any iurisdictio.26 In this sense, merum imperium is just potestas 
gladii. Its scope is restricted exclusively to animadvertere, which simply means 
chastisement ('punitionem ipsam significat'). 27  As such, in criminal trials merum 
                                                        
22  Ioannis Longovallius, Nova et facilis declaratio ad legem imperium ff. de iurisdictione omnium 
iudicium, Parisis, 1528. Longovallius’ treatise was divided in four parts. The first two were devoted to a 
lengthy critique of the relevant Bartolist authors. The third, and rather shorter, to an exposition of the 
correct approach on the subject. The fourth, and longest, to its applications. Merum imperium consists of 
mera coerc[it]io (pt. 3, fol. 20v), whereas in mixtum imperium coercion is instrumental to the exercise of 
iurisdictio (ibid., fol. 21r). The difference between the two lies therefore in that the coercitio of mixtum 
imperium is but a means to a different end, which is iuris-dictio in its broad sense (ibid., fol. 22r). It 
follows that the modica coercitio of mixtum imperium is instrumental to iurisdictio, and moreover that 
mixtum imperium and iurisdictio form a unitary category, radically opposed to merum imperium. 
23 Ioannis Gillotus, De iurisdictione et imperio libri duo, Parisiis, O. Mallardus, 1538. As this (in all 
probability, first) edition is extremely rare, I have relied on the more accessible version in Zilettus, 
Tractatus universi iuris, 1584, vol. III, pt. 1, fols. 2r-18r. 
24 Ibid., pt. 2, ch. 11-14, fols. 13r-15r, and ch. 15, n. 3, fol. 13r. 
25 Ibid., pt. 1, ch. 16, n. 1, fol. 8r. Cf. ibid., pt. 2, ch. 19, fol. 15r. 
26 Ibid., pt. 1, ch. 6, n. 2, fol. 3r. 
27 Ibid., pt. 1, ch. 7, fol. 3v, and esp. ch. 8-9, fol. 4r-v. 
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imperium refers exclusively to the executio of the decision.28 Being solely concerned 
with executio, it does not partake in the act of rendering the judgment. For criminal 
offences, merum imperium commences when iurisdictio finishes.29 By contrast, in civil 
proceedings merum imperium may be considered in its broader meaning of potestas 
iuris dicendi. The so-called lex imperium (D.2.1.3), concluded Gillotus, is clear in 
keeping distinct mixtum from merum imperium so long as the latter means gladii 
potestas animadvertendi in facinorosos homines. But when merum imperium does not 
have such a meaning, the execution of the decision may well be entrusted to the same 
magistrate that pronounced it.30  
 
Insisting on the residual nature of merum imperium and on the strict separation of 
executio from cognitio, Gillotus reached a deadlock. He was able to solve it only by 
resorting to some acrobatic interpretations of merum imperium, which however 
remained hardly satisfactory. At least, in the eyes of his fellow legal humanists. An 
attempt to solve the impasse was made by another (and more famous) French legal 
humanist, Petrus Loriotus (Pierre Loriot, d. 1568 ca.).31 Loriotus accepted Gillotus’ 
three-fold division of cognitio, sententia and executio, 32  but sought to avoid the 
resulting impasse. According to Loriotus, iurisdictio had to be kept wholly detached 
from merum imperium (which was merely 'delictorum coercio'), in accordance with the 
sources.33 On the other hand, it was imperative that the magistrate empowered with 
executio (and so with merum imperium) could also have cognitio, lest it appeared as a 
mere executioner. Logically, the only way to achieve both things was to relegate 
iurisdictio to the pronouncement of the sententia, and to keep it distinct from cognitio.34 
Hence, for Loriotus iurisdictio had to become only the act of pronouncing the decision, 
ius-dicere in the narrowest possible sense of the term.35 This way, merum imperium 
and iurisdictio would remain separated, but at the same time the magistrate empowered 
with executio could also have cognitio of the matter.36  
Loriotus’ scheme was undoubtedly ingenious, but it did not meet with much success 
among other legal humanists. And this not because his dilemma of cognitio, sententia 
and executio might resemble the famous river-crossing puzzle with a wolf, a goat, and 
a cabbage. Rather, because the cure of Loriotus was almost worse than the Bartolian 
disease. Firstly, merum imperium was once again a general potestas encompassing the 
whole criminal jurisdiction.37 Secondly, Loriotus’ iurisdictio was even narrower than 
the Bartolists' iurisdictio simplex. Once again, albeit for different reasons, it occupied 
                                                        
28 Ibid., pt. 1, ch. 10, n. 2, fols. 4v-5r; pt. 2, ch. 3, n. 1-2, fol. 7v, and ch. 5, fol. 8v. 
29 Ibid., pt. 2, ch. 5, n. 9-10, fol. 8v. 
30 Ibid., pt. 2, ch. 6, n. 6, fol. 9r-v. 
31 Petrus Loriotus, De iurisdictione et imperio, in Id. De Iuris Apicibus, Tractatus, vol. VIII, Ludguni, 
apud Sebastianum Gryphium, 1545, cols. 29-46. Loriotus was probably the only legal humanist to write 
on the subject in a schematic (and concise) way. 
32 Ibid., axiomata 15-16, cols. 33-34. 
33 Ibid., esp. axiomata 10, 14 -15, 25 cols. 32-34 and 36-37. 
34 Ibid., axioma 20, col. 35: 'Adde sanam non esse Gilloti interpretationem, causae cognitionem pro 
iurisdictione accipientis: cum res separatae sint, et assessor cognitionem habeat, non iurisdictionem: sit 
qu[a]e cognitio usque ad sententiam dumtaxat, iurisdictio proprie et in sententia est, et in executione'. 
Cf. ibid., axioma 25, col. 37: ‘merum purum significat: ut Imperium merum sit pura potestas et separata, 
non a cognitione (ut Gillotus arbitrabatur) sed a iurisdictione.’ 
35 Ibid., axiomata 1-3, cols. 29-30. 
36 Ibid., axioma 26, col. 37: 'non obstat quod in executionibus non admittatur causae cognitio, id enim 
ex eo fit, quod ante exequutionem (sic) iam plena causae cognitio adhibita fuit, sine qua nulla esset 
exequutio' (sic). 
37 Ibid., axioma 38, col. 41. Cf. also axiomata 26 and 38, cols. 37 and 41 respectively. 
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a very marginal role - in Loriotus, the mere pronouncement of the decision.38 Lastly, 
mixtum imperium (vaguely defined as 'potestas specialiter concessa, cui iurisdictio 
inest')39 was not - as we shall see - the main and nearly all-encompassing category of 
other humanist jurists, but it was relegated to the execution of civil decisions40 and to 
non-contentious jurisdiction.41  
 
Although of course incorrect, it would be tempting to use the 1540s to draw a line 
between earlier and later legal humanist works - both on our subject and, perhaps, 
beyond it. None of the earlier efforts of humanist jurists to provide a coherent and 
systematic picture of iurisdictio and imperium was particularly successful. But they 
remained the main ones. It was not the difficulty of the task that discouraged later 
authors. Rather, it was a progressive shift in their interest. From the 1540s their work 
became increasingly academic and abstract, and its focus progressively more detailed 
and specific. Each topic underwent a scrupulous scrutiny according to its adherence to 
classical sources, legal and non-legal alike. Whether any single sub-topic would fit into 
the larger picture, it was no longer the point. The more the attention focused on the 
single classical sources, the less it mattered whether they could underpin abstract and 
general principles. The door to unbridled historical and philological speculations, 
already unlocked, now burst open. 
With specific reference to our subject, it is with the 1540s that the 'deconstruction' of 
medieval iurisdictio lost its character of instrumentality, a means to the end of providing 
accurate categories more faithful to the sources. The emphasis was progressively more 
on the analysis of the sources and less on general legal categories. By and large, source 
analysis became an end to itself. Similarly, the early contrasts among scholars such as 
Longovallius, Gillotus and Loriotus (each devoting a considerable part of his work to 
questioning that of the others, Alciatus included) now became fully-fledged academic 
squabbles on the (allegedly, scarce) learning of the rivals.  
 
In the late 1540s Duarenus, Goveanus and Corasius proposed a new interpretation of 
iurisdictio and imperium. Franciscus Duarenus (François Douaren, 1509-1559),  
accepted the division between merum imperium on the one side and iurisdictio and 
mixtum imperium on the other, but he offered a new explanation for this, rooted on the 
jurisdictional prerogatives of different magistrates.42 The praetor had only jurisdiction 
in private disputes, not in criminal offences. Those were entrusted to the quaestores.43 
Shortly thereafter Antonius Goveanus (António de Gouveia, ca.1505-ca.1566) 
published his succinct comment to D.2.1.3.44 Goveanus agreed with Duarenus that 
                                                        
38 Ibid., axioma 38, col. 41 (‘nihil aliud [...] quam iuris dicendi officium, iure magistratus concessum’). 
Cf. also axiomata 26 and 36-37, cols. 37 and 40-41 respectively. 
39 Ibid., axioma 31, col. 39. Loriotus’ difficulty to provide a neat definition of mixtum imperium might 
derive from the complex efforts to disentangle cognitio from sententia. 
40 Ibid., axioma 38, col. 41. 
41  More specifically: bonorum possessio, missio in possessionem, restitutio, emancipatio, adoptio, 
interdicta prohibitoria and fideicommissa: ibid., axioma 33, cols. 39-40.  
42 Franciscus Duarenus, Disputationes anniversariae Liber primus, Ludguni, apud Seb. Gryphium, 1547, 
ch. 53, p. 128-132.  
43 Ibid., p. 129-130: 'Praetorem Romae creatum fuisse, ut ius diceret in urbe de causis negotiisque 
privatis, non ut animadverteret in facinorosos homines [...] Populus enim, cuius summa potestas erat, 
quoties animadversio necessaria videbatur, Quaesitores sive Quaestores constituebat, qui adversus 
facinorosos inquirerent, idque extra ordinem, cum nullo magistratu fungerentur'. 
44 Antonius Goveanus, ad Legem III D. Imperium, De iurisdictione omnium iudicium, Tolosae, 1545. I 
have used the later edition of Goveanus’ work edited by Meerman, Antonii Goveani opera iuridica, 
philologica, philosophica. Ex bibliotheca viri nobilis Gerardi Meerman edidit, vitamque auctoris 
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merum imperium related exclusively to capital punishment and that it belonged to 
'caeteri praetores' - mainly the quaestores - and not to the praetor urbanus.45 But in 
turn Gouvea offered a new interpretation on the division between iurisdictio, mixtum 
and merum imperium based on the prerogatives of each magistrate. While it is clear that 
the praetor urbanus lacked merum imperium and had both mixtum imperium and 
iurisdictio, the praeses provinciae enjoyed all three.46 The treatise of Ioannis Corasius 
(Jean de Coras, 1512-1572) followed.47 Although he did not refer explicitly to either 
Duarenus or Goveanus, Corasius agreed with them on the main points,48 especially on 
the division of prerogatives between praetor and quaestor.49 The main difference with 
his two colleagues lay in Corasius’ interpretation of mixtum imperium. To some extent, 
Corasius again proposed Gillotus’ all-encompassing notion of mixtum imperium. 
Moving from the separation of prerogatives between praetor and quaestor, Corasius 
reasoned, Gillotus’ shortcomings could be easily avoided. In any matter in which the 
praetor has cognitio, he also enjoys executio. Although in theory functional to the 
exercise of iurisdictio,50 in Corasius’ analysis mixtum imperium stretched beyond the 
scope of jurisdictional prerogatives. This allowed him to include in mixtum imperium 
also prerogatives more authoritative than strictly jurisdictional in their nature, such as 
in integrum restituere.51 
In between the publication of these treatises, Eguinarius Baro (François Eguinaire, 
Baron du Kerlouan, 1495-1550) sent to the press two works on the same subject, 
triggering one of the harshest disputes among legal humanists. Baro's theory resembled 
those of other humanist jurists only in the summa divisio between iurisdictio and 
mixtum imperium on the one hand and imperium merum on the other.52 Beyond that, it 
was sui generis. He used the lack of iurisdictio so characteristic of merum imperium to 
extend its scope - at the expenses of mixtum imperium. Thus, for Baro merum imperium 
does not consist solely in animadversio. Rather, what lacks iurisdictio is to be 
considered as merum imperium, and not as mixtum.53 Further, and moreover, he argued 
for a two-fold notion of iurisdictio. In its narrower sense, iurisdictio describes the 
prerogatives of the iudices pedanei (whereas the powers of the praetor are grouped 
together in mixtum imperium). 54  In its broader meaning, much to the contrary, 
                                                        
praemisit Iacobus van Vaassen, iurisconsvltvs, Roterodami, apud Henricum Beman, 1766, p. 3-6. 
Goveanus’ treatise was published in 1545, and so two years before Duarenus’. However the treatise of 
Duarenus must have circulated earlier, for Goveanus dedicated his treatise to Duarenus as a comment on 
his friend's work. 
45 Ibid., p. 5.  
46 Ibid., p. 5-6.  
47 Ioannis Corasius, Miscellaneorum iuris civilis libri sex, Ludguni, apud Gulielmum Rovillium, 1549, 
lib. 3, de iurisdictione et imperio, p. 272-280. 
48 Specifically: iurisdictio and mixtum imperium were bound together, and iurisdictio was completely 
separated from merum imperium, ibid., n. 1-2, p. 272-273 and n. 4, p. 275, respectively. On merum 
imperium see further ibid., n. 10, p. 277. 
49 Ibid., n. 5, p. 276. 
50 Corasius defined mixtum imperium as 'auctorita[s] et potesta[s] quandam decernendi, dandi, dicendi, 
addicendi et coercendi, in pecuniariis causis, citra tamen litis controversiae decisionem. Tunc enim esset 
iurisdictio, quae tamen, ut effectum habeat faciliusque explicari possit, mixto imperio ius dicendi utitur'. 
Ibid., n. 15, p. 279. Cf. also ibid., n. 6, p. 276. 
51 Ibid., n. 17-18, p. 279-280. 
52 Eguinarius Baro, Ad τα πρώτα Digestorum, Parisiis, apud Iacobum Gazellum, 1548, tit. 1, l. 3, fols. 
67v-68v; Id., Variarum quaestionum publice tractatarum, ad digesta iuris civilis l. de iurisdictione, 
Ludguni, apud Seb. Gryphium, 1548, p. 66-67 and 69-70. 
53 Id., Ad τα πρώτα Digestorum, cit., tit. 1, l. 4, fol. 68v. An example is the cautio praetoria, which for 
Baro does not belong to mixtum but to merum imperium (ibid.). 
54 Id., Ad digesta iuris civilis l. de iurisdictione, cit., p. 138. 
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iurisdictio represents the entire jurisdictional power. It follows that, in this second and 
general sense, iurisdictio is the genus encompassing also mixtum imperium.55 In this 
broader meaning, iurisdictio resembles more a general power than the limited task of 
settling a dispute. Looking back at the three-fold division between cognitio, sententia 
and executio, Baro argued that iurisdictio encompasses both sententia and executio, but 
not really cognitio - that is up to the delegated judge.56 At this juncture, it is hard to see 
any substantive difference with the old Bartolian 'tree of jurisdiction'. Indeed, in his 
apostasy, Baro arrived to speak the unspeakable: as a matter of fact, Bartolus was quite 
right, though he should have left out merum imperium.57 
The answer of Duarenus and Goveanus came at once.58 What is interesting for our 
purposes is that both replies went even deeper in their textual analysis than the original 
treatises, studiously avoiding any general overview. For it was precisely when an author 
sought to draw general conclusions that his argument detached from the Roman texts - 
and so it became most vulnerable.  
 
                                                        
55 Ibid., p. 106, 'Iurisdictio enim dicitur generaliter, et cum decernit, et cum iudicat qui iurisdictionem 
habet: Mistum imperium, quod magis est imperij quam iurisdictionis, species est eius iurisdictionis'; 
ibid., p. 83: 'Consequens est igitur ut iurisdictio, quae misto imperio inest, de re privata iurisdictio sit, 
quae decretis omnibus inesse recte dicitur'; ibid., p. 156: 'Quisquis habet iurisdictionem, idem hoc 
quoque imperium habet, de habente generalem iurisdictionem accepit: qualis est Praetor urbanus 
Romae, et Praeses in provincia'. Cf. ibid., p. 136. 
56  Ibid., p. 154-155: 'Non enim ius dicit proprie qui decernit iudicium, sed imperat, ut per alium 
iudicantem, ipse ius dixisse videatur. Nam nec ipsa cognitio causae, iurisdictio est: sed ipsa pronuntiatio, 
et sententia magistratus, aut eius cui mandavit iurisdictionem: et hoc in civili negotio, qud propria legis 
actione ordinatur d. l. notionem de verb. sign. [D.50.16.99] Deinde ait [Cicero, ad Heren. I.1] de imperio 
misto. Et hoc quidem imperium ideo mistum dicitur, quia iurisdictioni admistum, et coniunctum est, 
pertinentque omnino ad officium ius dicentis: adeo ut quisquis habet iurisdictionem, hoc quoque 
imperium habeat; et qui hoc imperio utitur, ius dicentis officio fungi existimetur'. See also ibid., p. 161, 
'Quod vero executionem sententiae, negat extremum esse iurisdictionis, supra a nobis refellitur: ubi ius 
dici non solum in constituendis iudicijs, et dandis iudicibus, sed in cognoscendo quoque, diiudicando 
causas privatas, et exequendo dictas iam sententias, ostendimus.' 
57 Ibid., p. 122: 'Bartolus iurisdictionem misto imperio inesse, ut genus inest speciei, non male scripsit: 
sed male tam generaliter accepit iurisdictionem, ut merum quoque imperium complectatur in misti 
imperij definitione'. Cf. ibid., p. 156. On the contrary, when considered in its narrow sense, for Baro 
iurisdictio was precisely Bartolus' iurisdictio simplex: 'huius imperij ea particula, quae in cognoscendis, 
iudicandisque privatis causis, et civilibus versatur, iurisdictio angustissima verbi huius significatione, 
appellata est' (ibid., p. 68; cf. also p. 71-72).   
58 The structure of the two works against Baro provides an interesting example of different approaches 
to the refined art of invective. Published in 1549, Duarenus’ (short) reply commences with his 
reconstruction of iurisdictio and imperium. Each attack on Baro is aimed at strengthening his own theory, 
so that attack and defence are developed together. Once both are fully laid down, Duarenus focuses on 
the adversary in a crescendo of abuses (first on his Bartolian sympathies, then quite in general, just in 
case), De iurisdictione et imperio apologia Fr. Douareni iur. adv. Eg. Baronem iurisconsultum, in Id., 
Opera Omnia, Ludguni, apud Guliel. Rovillium, 1554, n. 18, fols. 73v-74r, and n. 19-20, fol. 74r-v 
respectively). By contrast, in his (remarkably long) De Iurisdictione libri II, adversus Eguinarium 
Baronem, Tolosae, apud Ioannem Molinerium, 1551, Goveanus neatly separates attack from defence. 
The first (and shorter) of his two books reports the most salient passages of Baro' work, in order to 
demolish every single line of it (ibid., p. 1-12). The second (and considerably longer) book (p. 13-46) on 
the contrary focuses exclusively on Goveanus’ own theory (see esp. ad l. 3 [D.2.1.3], p. 23-24). 
Regrettably, Baro was indelicate enough to die during all this fun, so it fell to his disciple Edward 
Henryson to answer on his behalf, reaffirming Baro’s views and detracting his opponents’ (Eduardi 
Herysonis, Pro Eg. Barone Adversus A. Goveanum de iurisdictione libri II, Parisiis, apud Vincentium 
Sertenas, 1555). 
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Although he wrote his treatise while the controversy between Baro, Duarenus and 
Goveanus was at its apex,59 Ludovicus Charondas (Louis Le Caron, 1534-1613) was 
careful not to take sides - at least openly. Probably, because he did not entirely agree 
with either of them. As usual, he argued that iurisdictio and merum imperium should 
be kept separate, 60  and that iurisdictio formed a unitary category with mixtum 
imperium.61 However, unlike Baro, he did not qualify mixtum imperium as a species of 
the genus iurisdictio, 62  and unlike Duarenus and Goveanus he ascribed merum 
imperium to the dictator – not to the praeses. 63  The last point was particularly 
important: no magistrate holding merum imperium (that is, coercive powers) may also 
have iurisdictio.64 Opting for the dictator instead of the praeses had its advantages. 
Ironically, Baro affirmed openly what both Duarenus and Goveanus had prudently left 
unsaid. So long as we focus on the praetor urbanus, then the distinction between 
iurisdictio and merum imperium holds. But if we look at the praeses provinciae, it is 
clear that he enjoys both.65 Systematic expositions and strict adherence to the Roman 
sources have always proved to be poor bedfellows. Baro was attacked for his Bartolian 
deviations as much as for his efforts to systematise the unsystematisable.66 Charondas 
simply avoided any generalisation, and so escaped much criticism.  
 
Systematisation was dangerous and open to fierce attacks, and increasingly fewer 
humanist jurists ventured into general categories. But when they did, they moved 
carefully around the debris of previous intellectual wars. Although somewhat later than 
the group of legal humanist so far considered, Hugo Donellus (Hugues Doneau, 1527-
1591) provides an excellent example of this, and of how attempts at laying out a general 
structure to our subject were not completely abandoned by authors lato sensu 
                                                        
59 Ludovicus Charondas, Charondae Iurisconsulti Parisiensis ... de iurisdictione et imperio libellus, 
Parisiis, apud Ioannem Foucherium, 1553. 
60 Charondas accepted wholeheartedly the main tenets of Alciatus' reading and brought them to their 
ultimate consequences. The starting point was the summa divisio between merum imperium and 
iurisdictio (Charondas, de iurisdictione et imperio libellius, cit., n. 3-4, fols. 47v-48v). As merum 
imperium is exclusively concerned with animadversio, it may not take part in iurisdictio. By contrast, 
and simply enough, iurisdictio is ‘licentia iuris dicundi’ (ibid., n. 5, fol. 48v). Iurisdictio therefore 
stretches from the hearing of the controversy to its adjudication (ibid., n. 8, fol. 51r). It follows that there 
is no need to neatly separate cognitio from sententia, for iurisdictio and mixtum imperium form a unitary 
and indivisible category (ibid., n. 3-4, fols. 47v-48v). Even more, mixtum imperium is somewhat 
instrumental to ius dicere (ibid., n. 20, fol. 59r). The old adage that 'iurisdictio sine modica coercitione 
nulla est' does not imply the subordination of iurisdictio to imperium. Rather, it strengthens the 
indivisibility of iurisdictio and mixtum imperium (ibid., n. 20, fols. 58r-59r). Also, the same principle 
further separates them from merum imperium: the kind of coercion which merum imperium requires is 
structurally different from the 'modica coercitio' of mixtum imperium. Missio in possessionem and gladii 
potestas perfectly represent such a difference (ibid., n. 22, fol. 60r). 
61 Ibid., n. 15, fols. 55v-56r. 
62 Rather - although never openly - Charondas argued for the very opposite. He was particularly adamant 
in that mixtum imperium was not just the modica coercitio instrumental to the exercise of iurisdictio, but 
the sum of the standard jurisdictional prerogatives: ibid., n. 17, fol. 56v and esp. n. 19-20, fols. 57v-59r. 
While formally distantiating himself from Baro (e.g. ibid., n. 4, fol. 48r-v), substantially Charondas 
reached similar conclusions. Just, for Charondas the general category was mixtum imperium and not, as 
in Baro, iurisdictio. But Charondas was prudent enough not to state as much openly.  
63 Ibid., n. 14, fol. 54r-v.  
64 Ibid., n. 15, fol. 55r-v. 
65 Baro, Ad digesta iuris civilis l. de iurisdictione, cit., p. 41. 
66 Even with regard to the prerogatives of the praetor, which in theory encompassed all mixtum imperium, 
Baro had to make an exception for fideicommissa, which belonged exclusively to the consul. Baro, Ad 
τα πρώτα Digestorum, cit., tit. 1, ad l. 11 [D 2.1.11], fol. 69v. 
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considered as legal humanists.67 Unlike Baro, Donellus' work did not receive harsh 
critiques. And not just as his comment on imperium and iurisdictio was published 
posthumously. 68  But because Donellus looked exclusively at their application in 
Roman history - especially the Classical period. Nonetheless, it is easy to detect 
interesting parallels in between Donellus and some of the humanist jurists so far 
mentioned. After the usual definition of merum imperium69 and the statements on the 
indivisibility of iurisdictio and mixtum imperium,70 Donellus argued that, by and large, 
any form of imperium is executio.71 If iurisdictio could not be divided from mixtum 
imperium, and mixtum imperium is ultimately executio, it follows that the magistrate 
with iurisdictio (the praetor first of all) has both cognitio and executio.72 Further, while 
iurisdictio and mixtum imperium may not be separated, the ancillary function of the 
latter makes iurisdictio as the principal category among the two.73 The dichotomy, 
observed Donellus, is between iurisdictio and merum imperium. But their structural 
difference does not necessarily entail their incompatibility: the same magistrate may 
well have both,74 as - he argued - it is the case of the praetor.75 
 
Later humanist jurists did not add much to the debate, which progressively became a 
highly specialised historical disquisition on magistrates in ancient Rome. Before this 
happened, however, the main features of the legal humanistic interpretation of 
jurisdiction were already neatly defined, and they might be summed up in broad terms. 
Merum imperium was utterly marginalised, largely to the benefit of mixtum imperium. 
The same mixtum imperium was increasingly considered as inseparable from 
iurisdictio, for without some degree of coercion ius dicere non potest. The distinction 
between private and public utility was largely rejected,76 as well as that between iudex 
nobilis and mercenarius.77 As such, the hierarchy among the three components of the 
                                                        
67 Donellus is a fine example of the plurality of distinct scholarships grouped together under the mos 
gallicus umbrella. Donellus' work was probably the first great systematic re-arrangement of all Civil law. 
In order to include him among legal humanists, it was necessary to add systematisation to the main aims 
of humanist jurists. As it happens, few things are more remote from legal humanism than systematisation. 
68 Donellus' work on iurisdictio and imperium was published only in 1596 as part of the seventeenth 
book of his Commentarii by Scipio Gentili. I have however opted for Hilliger's edition (Donellus 
Enucleatus, originally published in two volumes, the first in 1611 and the second in 1613, both at Jena) 
in the neat and carefully edited edition printed at Lucca in between 1762 and 1777. 
69 Hugo Donellus, Opera Omnia, vol. IV, Lucae, 1764, lib. 17, ch. 8, n. 20-21, cols. 1142-1149. 
70 Ibid, book 17, ch. 8, n. 14-15, cols. 1130-1134. 
71  Ibid., book 17, ch. 8, n. 21, col. 1146: 'imperium in universum dici exsequendi potestatem, 
efficiendique, ut ratum sit, quod magistratus statuerit.' Cf. also ibid., n. 15, col. 1133. 
72 Ibid., book 17, ch. 6, n. 5-7, cols. 1087-90; cf. ibid., ch. 7, n. 7, cols. 1103-1105, and n. 15-16, cols. 
1113-1116.  
73  'Sed quia iurisdictio natura prior est, quam imperio adiuncto confirmari oportet, idem, magis 
imperium iurisdictioni accedere, eique cohaere, et misceri videtur,' ibid., book 17, ch. 8, n. 14, col. 1131. 
Cf. more broadly the whole cols. 1130-1134.  
74 'Isto modo et merum imperium dictum, quod alterius rei misturam non habet, solum et per se imperium. 
Sed nondum id dicimus; quod res est. Nam si id ista infinite et generaliter dicatur, certe falsum sit 
potestatem animadvertendi in facinorosos esse imperium merum, seu non mistum. Quaecumque enim 
haec potestas est, coniuncta est cum cognitione,' ibid., book 17, ch. 8, n. 21, cols. 1146-1148. 
75 Ibid., ch. 8, n. 23, col. 1151. 
76 Even those jurists, such as Donellus, who retained it did so within an entirely different framework 
from the traditional ius commune one: ibid, ch. 7, n. 5, col. 1101. 
77 While rejecting it in principle, this division often resurfaced among legal humanists, chiefly because 
of the temptation to identify the iudex nobilis with the praetor, and the mercenarius with the iudex 
pedaneus. But this simply added fuel to the scholarly debate, for it triggered endless disputes on whether 
the iurisdictio of the praetor had to be narrowed down to the simple datio iudicis, or whether the praetor 
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Accursian notion of iurisdictio was turned entirely upside-down. Mixtum imperium, 
inextricably linked to iurisdictio, was now the most important of the three categories, 
encompassing the vast majority of jurisdictional functions. Beyond this, each legal 
humanist had different ideas on both definition and scope of the three categories, 
especially iurisdictio and mixtum imperium. 'Pure' iurisdictio was especially tantalising, 
as well as the issue of which specific prerogatives should fall into mixtum imperium, 
and why. 
 
 
iv. In the Euripidean tragedy, the gods had the good sense of intervening one at time. 
Legal humanism suffered from an overpopulated Olympus. All of a sudden, lawyers 
were faced with a number of different and mutually-contradicting theories, all of which 
could however claim stronger links with the Roman sources than the traditional ius 
commune one. Whatever the defects of the tradition, the avalanche of new theories had 
a deeply destabilising effect. In a few decades, the entire subject of iurisdictio became 
extremely confusing. In the words of Ioannis Bologneti (Giovanni Bolognetti, 1506-
1575), ‘such a variety of opinions created a huge confusion in the meaning of the law’.78 
Similar comments became so frequent that it would be pointless (and probably 
impossible) to list them in full.79  
 
The later ius commune production is typically considered as exceedingly practical-
minded and hardly interested in general and theoretical discussions. This is true to some 
extent. For even the most pragmatically-oriented (or plainly casuistic) lawyers clearly 
relied on the Bartolian scheme. To give an extreme example, in the 252 pages of his 
consilia devoted to iurisdictio, the famed jurist De Luca never once discussed the 
Bartolian categories. But he always presupposed them.80  
Commentators had always tested the Bartolian jurisdictional scheme, from Baldus to 
the very eve of the legal humanist attack.81 But those discussions always occurred 
                                                        
could actually hear the case and pronounce the judgment by himself and, in such a case, whether the 
iudex pedaneus could be said to ius dicere at all and, if not, how to define his jurisdictional role. 
78 'Ista varietate opinionum causatur confusio magna in intellectu legis', Ioannis Bologneti, In primam 
Digesti veteris repetitiones, Neapoli, apud Raymundum de Amato, 1558, ad D.2.1.3, n. 1, fol. 187r. 
79 One might even move of a few decades a time and list the similar complaints he finds published then. 
So, for instance, about forty years after Bologneti, the extensive commentary of Delrío and de Brosses 
read, sub D.2.1: ‘Mansit res per se satis aperta incertior quam antea, saepe nimirum litigando veritas 
amittitur’ (Martín Antonio Delrío and Pierre de Brosses, Ex Miscellaneorum scrptoribus digestorum sive 
pandectarum iuris civilis interpretatio, index authorum atque Scriptorum miscellaneorum; Index 
Titulorum Pandectarum, 2nd edn., Ludguni, apud Franciscum Fabrum, 1590, ad D.2.1, col. 74). Again, 
forty years later, Lindenspür remarked ‘tam incertae autem hodie sunt de iurisdictione opiniones, 
variaeque consuetudines ac observantiae, totaeque eius species, quas aut usus, aut necessitas, aut 
quantoque adulatio peperit’ (Georg Ludvich Lindenspür, Dissertatio de successionibus ac mutationibus 
imperiorum ac familiarum, Ingolstadii, Typis Gregorii Haenlini, 1638, p. 97, n. 2). 
80 Giovanni Battista de Luca, Theatrum Veritatis et Justitiae, lib. 3, pt. 1, De jurisdictione et foro 
competenti, Coloniae Agrippinae, Sumptibus Societatis, 1691. De Luca is hardly an isolated example: 
see e.g. Federico Scotti, Consilia seu Responsa, Venetiis, apud Vincentium Valgrisium, 1572, vol. I, lib. 
3, resp. 13, n. 1 and 3, p. 251; vol. II, lib. 6, resp. 22 and 38, fols. 24v-25r and 39r-40r respectively, and 
lib. 8, resp. 5, fols. 122r-123v; Marco Antonio Natta, Consilia, 1588, Francofurti ad Moenum, impensis 
Signis. Feyerab. (1st edn. 1558, Lyon), vol. I, cons. 82, n. 6-8, fol. 64r; vol. II, cons. 405, n. 1-3, fol. 107r-
v; Giovanni Battista Saminiati, Controversiae Forenses, Genuae, sumptibus Antonii Georgii Franchelli, 
1686, contr. 24, n. 20, p. 306; contr. 96, n. 24-26, p. 801; contr. 99, n. 33, p. 817. 
81  E.g. Filippo Decio, Commentaria in Digesti Vete[ri] et Cod[ici], Ludguni, 1567 (1st edn. 1523, 
Venice), ad D.2.1.1, § Ius dicentis, n. 10, fol. 25r. Possibly one of the last authors who questioned the 
Bartolian scheme without mentioning the humanist jurists was Gian Girolamo Albani, Lucubrationes ad 
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within the Accursian gloss, never against it. Now, for the first time, it became vital to 
defend the very grounds on which the entire jurisdictional framework was built. From 
the second half of the sixteenth century, when a work touched upon the subject of 
jurisdiction only in passim it usually adhered to the Bartolian scheme in a few lines and 
quickly moved on.82 Other times it simply avoided the whole issue.83 But when a 
treatise was devoted (in full or in part) to the subject of jurisdiction, it typically looked 
at the Bartolian scheme with a significant (humanistic) attention to the sources, in order 
to defend it.84 
                                                        
Bartolum, Venetiis, 1571, ad De iurisdictione omn. Iud., fols. 73r-75v, and ad summarium in l. imperium, 
fol. 76r. 
82  E.g. Johann Oldendorp, Loci Communes Iuris Civilis, Ludguni, apud Seb. Gryphium, 1545, § 
Iurisdictio, p. 173; Marco Bassanello, Colloquia, seu dialogi, Venetiis, ex officina Erasmiana, Vincentii 
Valgrisii, 1553, dialogue 23, p. 55-56, and dialogue 97, p. 211; Sebastian Brant, Titulorum omnium iuris 
tam civilis quam canonici Expositiones, Ludguni, apud Seb. Gryphium, 1553, ad D.2.1.2, de 
iurisdictione omnium iudicium, p. 16; Bernhard Wurmser, Practicarum Observationum, Basileae, per 
Thomam Guarinum, 1570, lib. 1, de Iudicibus, n. 15, p. 6-7; Hartmannus Hartmann, Practicarum 
Observationum, Basileae, per Thomam Guarinum, 1570, lib. 2, De Iudiciis, esp. n. 6, p. 177, and n. 16, 
p. 183; Dethar Horst, Synopsis Thesium sive Axiomatum Iuris, ad primam partem Pandectarum seu 
Digestorum Iuris Civilis Romani, Helmstadii, excudebat Iacobus Lucius Transylvanus, 1583, ad D.2.1, 
n. 1-4; Alessandro Turamini, Commentarii, Florentiae, apud F. Tosium, 1592, lib. 3, ch. 2, n. 38, p. 138; 
Tiberio Deciani, Responsorum, Venetiis, apud Vassallinum, 1602, vol. IV, resp. n. 40, n. 2-3, p. 168v, n. 
21-23, fol. 170v, and n. 47, fol. 172v; Giulio Pace, Synopsis Juris Civilis, Argentorati, sumptibus Lazari 
Zetzneri Bibliopol, 1607, lib. 2, n. 1, p. 15; Id., Methodica ad Iustinianeum Codicem, Ludguni, 1606, lib. 
3, tit. 13, ch. 1, n. 4-6, p. 190, ch. 2, n. 2-4, p. 192; ch. 3, n. 23-24, p. 192-193; ch. 4, n. 31-32, p. 194; 
Marco Antonio Mureti, In titulos ad Materiam Iurisdictionis Pertinentes Commentarii, Francofurti, 
sumptibus ac typis Ioannis Bringeri, 1615, esp. p. 139-140; Ettore Capecelatro, Selectiorum 
Consultationum iuris, Neapoli, typis Iacobi Gassari, sumptibus Io. Dominici Bove, 1643, lib. 1, cons. 
41, n. 9, p. 314.  
83 This attitude had apparently little to do with the importance of the work or of the author, for it is 
attested among some of the most celebrated writings as much as in the less known ones: e.g. Prospero 
Farinacci, Praxis et Theoricae Criminalis, Ludguni, sumptibus Iacobi Cardon, 1634, vol. I, pt. 1, q. 7, p. 
58-75 (on the subject of the iudex incompetens); Marco Antonio Peregrino, De iurisdictione Ordinaria 
et Delegata, in Id., Tractatus varii, Venetiis, apud Nicolaum Polum, 1611; Cristopher Cuppener, 
Commentarii, Francofurti, typis Matthiae Beckeri, 1605, p. 118-119; Erasmo of Chokier, Tractatus 
Iurisdictionis Ordinariae in Exemptos, Coloniae Agrippinae, apud Joannem Kinckium, 1624, p. 355, n. 
4. 
84 Among the enormous production of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries see e.g. Jean 
Brèche, Ad titulum pandectarum De Verborum & rerum significatione Commentarii, Ludguni, apud 
Ioannem Temporalem, 1556, ad D. 50.16.215, § Potestatis verbo, p. 431-433, esp. n. 4, p. 432-433; 
Johannes Althusius, Iuris Romani Libri duo, Basileae, ad Lecythum Waldkirchianam, 1586, lib. 1, ch. 8, 
p. 18; Pierre Du Faur de Saint-Jorry (Petrus Faber), ad Tit. de Diversis Regulis Iuris antiqui [...] 
Commentarius, Ludguni, apud Franciscum Fabrum, 1590, ad D.50.17.70, n. 7-10, 14-15, 18-20, 23-27 
and 36, p. 179-184; Ludovico Carboni, Tractatus de legibus, Venetiis, apud Ioannem Guerilium, 1599, 
lib. 11, disp. 10, p. 497-501; Tobias Paurmeister, De iurisdictione imperii Romani libri II, Hanoviae, 
Impensis Petri Kopffii, 1608, ch. 7-9, n. 1, p. 49-56, and esp. ch. 9, p. 56-67; Orazio Marta, Tractatus de 
iurisdictione inter iudicem ecclesiasticum et laicum exercenda, Moguntiae, ex typographia Iohannis 
Albini, 1609, vol. I, pt. 1, ch. 8, n. 1-3 and 5-7, p. 19; Marco Antonio Mureti, In titulos ad Materiam 
Iurisdictionis Pertinentes, Francofurti, sumptibus ac typis Ioannis Bringeri, 1615, p. 139-140; Helfrich 
Ulrich Hunnius, De iurisdictione tractatus, Giessae, Typis Casparis Chemlin, 1616, esp. pt. 1, ch. 1, n. 
1-2, p. 22-25, and ch. 2, q. 3, p. 70-71; Camillo Borrello, De Magistratuum edictis, Francofurti ad 
Moenum, typis Hartmanni Palthenii, sumptibus Haeredum D. Zachariae Palthenii, 1621, lib. 1, ch. 17, 
n. 24-32, p. 235-237; Hermann Vulteius, Commentarius at tit. Codicis, qui sunt de iurisdictione et foro 
competenti, Francofurti, sumptibus Godefridi Tampachij, 1630, ad C.3.13, n. 4-12, p. 10, and n. 79, p. 
48; Jacob Brinkmann, Dissertatio ad vexatissimam l. de iurisdictione, Jenae, typis Viduae Weidnerianae, 
1631, thesis 1, n. 2-4, 6-7, 9-10, 16, 25-32. Special mention should also be made of the number of lexica 
iuridica printed between the late sixteenth and the early seventeenth century - often the most 
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A particularly vehement apology of the Bartolian categories was that of Hieronymus 
Muscornius (Hieronimo Muscornio). Muscornius allowed only for minor corrections 
to the traditional interpretation of the lex imperium,85 which he shielded with many 
'counter-quotations' from classical sources,86 as well as with some new interpretations 
of Latin terms. In particular, he stressed that the verb ‘animadvertere’ is a neuter term, 
since it just means ‘vertere animum, atque mentem’.87 As such, it may not be used in a 
narrow sense. The animadversio in facinorosos homines of Ulpian in D.2.1.3, therefore, 
does not mean that merum imperium is confined to the execution of criminal 
punishments. Rather, and precisely after Bartolus, for Muscornius merum imperium is 
suprema potestas.88  
Muscornius’ somewhat drastic attempt was a relatively isolated case. Especially on 
merum imperium, most jurists tended to agree with legal humanists. 'Merum' meant 
'purum', not 'summum', and as such it had to be relegated to criminal disputes. 89 
Complete repudiation of legal humanist critiques did not prove successful: some 
compromises had to be made. Significantly enough, narrowing merum imperium to 
criminal proceedings was the main concession to legal humanism that a jurist as 
important and representative of the later ius commune as Iacobus Menochius (Jacopo 
Menochio, 1532-1607) could allow. Menochius stated as much at the very beginning 
of his treatise on iurisdictio.90  Apart from that, however, he fully adhered to the 
traditional Bartolian scheme,91 stressing in particular the concept of imperium as a 
unitary category.92 No matter how Haloander’s edition of the Digest would read, for 
Menochius iurisdictio clearly came from iuris-ditio, as attested in a number of classical 
sources, ranging from Cicero to Virgil.93 Menochius’ use of classical texts is revealing 
of an extremely widespread attitude. On a superficial level, it betrays the effort of many 
lawyers to pay back legal humanists’ attacks in kind.94 More deeply, however, it attests 
                                                        
representative of the market (and so of the interest of lawyers at large). They typically build on the 
Bartolian systematisation with significant openings to the new humanist interpretation.  
85 Hieronymus Muscornius, Tractatus de Iurisdictione atque imperio, Coloniae Agrippinae, in Officina 
Ioannis Gymnici, 1596. On the Bartolian scheme in general see esp. n. 12, p. 5, and n. 18, p. 8-9; on the 
distinction between private and public utility see n. 63-66, p. 56-68, and n. 78-79, p. 75-76; on the subject 
of mixtum imperium see in particular n. 31, p. 21-22, n. 145, p. 144, n. 149-156, p. 150-156, and n. 158-
163, p. 156-161. 
86 Ibid., esp. n. 4-16, p. 2-7; n. 33, p. 23, n. 36, p. 25, n. 38, p. 28. 
87 Ibid., n. 44, p. 35. 
88 Ibid., esp. n. 31, p. 21-22 and n. 38, p. 28. Cf. also n. 36, p. 25. The distinction between cognitio and 
animadversio is similarly dismissed through the example of the quaestores, who enjoyed both: ibid., n. 
14, p. 7. 
89 E.g. Hunnius, De iurisdictione tractatus, cit., pt. 1, ch. 1, quaest. 4, n. 1, p. 39-40; Horst, Synopsis, cit., 
ad D.2.1, n. 5, p. 48; Althusius, Iuris Romani Libri duo, cit., lib. 1, ch. 8, p. 18; Carboni, Tractatus de 
legibus, cit., lib. 11, disp. 10, p. 497-498; Marta, Tractatus de iurisdictione, cit., vol. I, pt. 1, ch. 36, n. 
10-12 and 25-26, p. 110-111. 
90  Iacobus Menochius, De imperio et iurisdictione commentarii posthumi, duobus libris expositi, 
Francofurti, sumptibus Danielis et Davidis Aubriorum, et Clementis Schleichii, 1622, lib. 1, ch. 1, p. 2. 
See further ch. 5, n. 4, and esp. n. 17, p. 53-54. Cf. also ch. 5, n. 18-20, p. 54-56 (on the scope of merum 
imperium in the Roman sources), ch. 15 [q. 8], n. 2-3, p. 134-135 (on fines), and ch. 16 [q. 9], n. 2-6, p. 
145-147 (on confiscation).  
91 ibid., lib. 1, ch. 1, n. 1-3, p. 2-4. In particular, Menochius approved of the two-fold Bartolian notion of 
iurisdictio as genus and species (ibid., ch. 1, n. 4-9, p. 4-8, and ch. 2, n. 1-2, p. 10-11, n. 9-10, p. 15-16, 
n. 23, p. 23-24; ch. 3, n. 1, p. 27, n. 5, p. 29-30).  
92 Ibid., lib. 1, ch. 7, n. 2, p. 85. 
93 Ibid., lib. 1, ch. 2, n. 25-26, p. 24-26. 
94 One of the most draconian examples in this direction was the Lexicon iuridicum of Sichardus, who 
went as far as accusing Ulpian of having ‘usurped’ the concept of iurisdictio (‘Iurisdictionis verbum ab 
Ulpiano in d. l. imperium [D.2.1.3] stricte et anguste usurpari’), narrowing down a much broader 
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to the growing interest for a meticulous examination of the sources also among 
Bartolists (who otherwise would have not felt the need to answer to the humanist jurists’ 
critiques in the first place). If a word or a concept was attested in classical sources, legal 
and extra-legal alike, it gave weight to the legal argument. Even a Bartolist as orthodox 
as Muscornius insisted on the importance of interpreting Latin terms according to the 
sources, not to their modern usage.95 Thus, behind the courtain of endless debates on 
the exact meaning of legal terms in the classical sources, there lay practical 
consequences - not philological appetites.96 By the eve of the seventeenth century no 
systematic treatise dealing with jurisdictional issues could avoid long digressions into 
historical and philological discussions. Unfaithfulness to Roman sources became 
progressively a clear sign of being plainly wrong. As a consequence, many jurists paid 
increasing attention to the exact terminology used in Roman sources. Yet, attention to 
the sources always remained a means, not an end. The end was more practical: 
grounding current legal issues into ius commune categories - and solving them 
accordingly.97 
 
Apart from Menochius and Muscornius, the most important (and quoted) among the 
treatises seeking to conciliate Bartolism with the main critiques of legal humanism 
opted for very elaborated schemes. While apparently detaching themselves from the 
Bartolian orthodoxy, such treatises ultimately aimed at protecting the traditional 
jurisdictional framework. Among them, mention should be made of at least three: those 
of Bologneti, Obrecht and Bocerus.  
Bologneti divided iurisdictio and imperium in three different categories (legislative, 
jurisdictional and equitable), 98  according to their object. 99  Then, he divided the 
jurisdictional category into actio and persecutio, actio corresponding to (jurisdicitonal) 
iurisdictio, and persecutio to (jurisdictional) imperium. In turn, and lastly, 
(jurisdictional) persecutio was segmented into criminalis and civilis after the divide 
                                                        
category (i.e that of iuris-ditio). Simon Sichardus, Lexicon iuridicum, Coloniae Agrippinae, apud 
haeredes Iohannis Gymnici, 1600, § imperium, p. 437. 
95 ‘Verba quando latine concipiunctur esse semper interpretanda secundum latinos, et non vulgares 
homines’. Muscornius, Tractatus de Iurisdictione atque imperio, cit., n. 22, p. 11. Muscornius’ insistence 
on the correct interpretation of the sources derived from his view of legal humanism as a degeneration 
of philology applied to the law. In his view, the fallacy of humanist jurists lay in their exasperate attention 
to the abstract meaning of a word, extrapolated from its broader – and legal – context. 
96 For example, one of such debates focused on the exact meaning of the key-word ‘animadvertere’. In 
order to prove that merum imperium consisted of both cognitio and executio, Bologneti divided the phrase 
‘animadver[sio] in facinorosos homines’ of D.2.1.3 in two parts. Animadversio stood for cognitio, 
whereas its application 'in facinorosos homines’ represented the executio. Bologneti, In primam Digesti 
veteris repetitiones, cit., ad D.2.1.3, n. 26, fol. 190r. In order to achieve the same result with somewhat 
sounder arguments, Bocerus looked at many classical sources, and concluded that animadversio was 
used both in the sense of cognoscere and coercere. Henricus Bocerus, Disputatio de iurisdictione, 
Tubingae, typis Georgij Gruppenbachij, 1597, n. 14, let. a-c, p. 15. Such a conclusion was harshly 
criticised by Hunnius, De iurisdictione tractatus, cit., pt. 1, ch. 1, q. 3, n. 3, p. 31-32, who pointed that 
in legal Roman sources (as opposed to extra-legal ones) its meaning was only that of coercere.  
97 For instance, when commenting on de in ius vocando (D.2.1.4) Petrus Costalius (Pierre Coustau) 
introduced the subject with Duarenus’ definition. But then he moved on, perfidly (but lucidly) noting 
how 'nos qui iure pro ratione utimur, opinor, tantam scrupulositatem non servamus' (Costalius, Ad XXV 
Libros Priores Pandectarum Adversaria, Coloniae, apud Ioannem Kreps, 1627, p. 76).  
98  More correctly, statutaria ('iurisdictio condendi iura quam ego appello statutariam'), iuditiaria 
(‘iurisdictio redendi iura vel ius dicendi seu administrandi iustitiam quam ego appello iuditiariam'), and 
gratiosa (‘iurisdictio equitatis statuendi et gratias faciendi et dispensandi quam ego appello gratiosam'). 
As such, iurisdictio gratiosa was somewhat broader than equitable jurisdiction, as it also encompassed 
pardons. Bologneti, In primam Digesti veteris repetitiones, cit., ad D.2.1.3, n. 4, fol. 177r. 
99 Ibid., n. 4-6, and n. 10, fols. 187v-188r. 
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between merum and mixtum imperium. This way (jurisdictional) persecutio criminalis 
would correspond to merum imperium, and (jurisdictional) persecutio civilis to mixtum 
imperium.100 In this new and complex scheme the old Accursian classification became 
more tenable, as Bologneti was effectively moving elsewhere any segment of medieval 
iurisdictio not attested in the sources.101 Moreover, Bologneti's scheme could better 
support the Bartolian division between private and public utility - which he felt was not 
close enough to the sources - and also that between noble and mercenary judges.102 For 
both divisions would now refer only to jurisdictional iurisdictio and imperium - and not 
also to the legislative and equitable ones.103 
Georgius Obrecht (Georg Obrecht, 1547-1612) sought to defend the Accursian notion 
of iuris-ditio by classifying iurisdictio as a conceptual category (notio), and not - as in 
Bartolus - a proper power (potestas).104 This way, iurisdictio could still be used in its 
broadest possible meaning but, in accordance with the sources, it was now wholly 
separated from imperium (which on the contrary remained potestas).105 The extreme 
breadth of the term 'notio' lent itself perfectly to both meanings in which Bartolus used 
iurisdictio, an all-encompassing genus and a narrow category.106 In order to further 
separate iurisdictio from imperium, Obrecht stressed the closeness between imperium 
merum and mixtum, naming them 'plenum' and 'minus plenum' respectively.107 Within 
mixtum imperium, Obrecht further distinguished between those prerogatives which 
were strictly instrumental to the exercise of iurisdictio and those which were not.108 
In comparison with Bologneti's and Obrecht's theories, that of Henricus Bocerus 
(Heinrich Bocer, 1561-1630) might look disharmingly simple. Bocerus fully accepted 
the new interpretation of humanist jurists, but divided iurisdictio in two kinds - 
ordinaria and specialis. Ordinaria iurisdictio corresponded to Bartolus' iurisdictio 
simplex together with a few prerogatives traditionally pertaining to mixtum 
imperium,109 whereas specialis iurisdictio grouped all those prerogatives more strictly 
associated with coercio than cognitio.110  We will return to all these theories soon 
enough.  
 
 
                                                        
100 Ibid., n. 14, fol. 188v.  
101 Ibid., n. 2 and 8-9, fols. 187v-188r, and esp. 23-24, fol. 189v, n. 55-56, fol. 196r-v, n. 60-63, fols. 
197r-198r. 
102 Ibid., n. 11-13, fol. 188r-v. 
103 Ibid., n. 15, fol. 188v. Having fully explained his new scheme, Bologneti used it to shield the Bartolian 
classification from the main critiques of humanist jurists, meticulously listed, explained and dismissed 
one by one: ibid., n. 45-116, fols. 194v-208v. 
104 Georgius Obrecht, Disputatio de Iurisdictionis et Imperii Principiis, Argentinae, 1589, thesis 88.  
105 ibid., esp. theses 182-185. Specifically, Obrecht defined imperium as 'the power to give orders, to 
which one must obey' (‘imperium non male definiri videtur, iubendi potestas, cui parere necesse est’, 
ibid., thesis 193).   
106 Ibid., thesis 74: ‘dicitur notio: quia hoc vocabulum generale est, et tam cognitionem, quam iuris 
dictionem significat.’ When this notio was considered in its broadest meaning, then it encompassed both 
imperium and iurisdictio (simplex): ‘latissime considerata definiri potest notio criminalium et civilium 
causarum, quae vel lege vel iure magistratus competit, et cui interdum imperium cohaeret’, ibid., thesis 
73; cf. also thesis 36. 
107 Ibid., theses 223-225.  
108 Ibid., theses 351-352 and 353-356 respectively. 
109 Mainly, in integrum restituere and bonorum possessio: Bocerus, Disputatio de iurisdictione, cit., n. 
4, let. a-e, p. 3. 
110  'Specialis iurisdictio in iubendo consistere dicitur, quae ad dirimendam civilem controversiam, 
iubendo et imperando magis quam cognoscendo expeditur,’ ibid., n. 7, p. 5. See further ibid., n. 6, let. a-
f, p. 4-5, and n. 9, let. c, p. 7. 
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V. I have said earlier that many non-humanists considered historical and philological 
debates as important digressions which however were not the ultimate aim of their 
work. This seems to imply that 'proper' humanist jurists on the contrary regarded history 
and philology as an end to itself. Doubltess, some of them did. But the historian should 
always look with suspicion at 'purely' cultural struggles. The lex imperium was the 
cornerstone of the ius commune notion of authority. Deconstructing it, legal humanists 
attacked the legal foundations of centralised power. Just ten years after Alciatus' 
Paradoxa, the ultimate two consequences of the new approach were clearly outlined by 
Longovallius, and then shared by most humanist jurists. 
First and foremost, imperium (be it merum or mixtum) was hardly the province of 
political authority. It pertained exclusively to the judge. 111  Merum imperium was 
extremely narrow, just mera coercio, and its scope was limited to the execution of 
criminal judgments.112 The power to legislate (the highest example of merum imperium 
for the Bartolists) therefore could not be grounded on merum imperium.113 Mixtum 
imperium and iurisdictio on the other hand were to be interpreted with exclusive regard 
to the jurisdictional sphere. It followed that the prerogatives ascribed to mixtum 
imperium or iurisdictio did not compete to political authorities (first of all the prince), 
but only to the judges.114  
Secondly, and to our purposes even more importantly, the new approach had profound 
repercussions on delegated jurisdiction. The Digest was quite clear in that jurisdictional 
prerogatives pertaining to private controversies could be delegated, whereas any 
prerogative especially conferred by the law could not.115 As such, it was not possible to 
delegate merum imperium, whereas mixtum imperium (since iurisdictio coaeherens) 
could be freely delegated.116 At this point the insistence of most legal humanists on 
mixtum imperium as an all-encompassing category and on the marginality of merum 
imperium may be fully appreciated. The Accursian Gloss interpreted the Roman text as 
allowing to delegate only iurisdictio (simplex) and what parts of mixtum imperium were 
instrumental to its exercise.117 Bartolus’ systematisation added weight to this, for an 
obvious corollary of the basic distinction between iudex nobilis and mercenarius was 
that no prerogative belonging to the nobilis could be entrusted to the latter.118 The 
                                                        
111 Longovallius, Nova et facilis declaratio, cit., pt. 3, fol. 23v. Cf. Gillotus, De iurisdictione et imperio 
libri duo, cit., pt. 2, ch. 19, fol. 15r. 
112 Longovallius, Nova et facilis declaratio, cit., pt. 3, fol. 20v: 'imperium nihil aliud quod coer[ci]tionem 
et summam potestatem esse existimo'. 
113  'Meo iudicio non longe abest a veritate, nimirum, statuta condere, legitimare et multa alia non esse 
imperii, aut iurisdictionis, quia a non habentibus imperium aut iurisdictionem possunt exerceri ', ibid., 
pt. 3, fol. 23v. Cf. Gillotus, De iurisdictione et imperio libri duo, cit., pt. 2, ch. 20, n. 2, fol. 15v, and esp. 
ch. 21, n. 1, fol. 16r; Charondas, de iurisdictione et imperio libellius, cit., n. 11 and 13-15, fols. 53r-56r. 
114 Longovallius, Nova et facilis declaratio, cit., pt. 3, fol. 22v. Cf. Loriotus, De iurisdictione et imperio, 
cit., axioma 4, col. 4; Charondas, de iurisdictione et imperio libellius, cit., n. 7-8 and 10, fols. 50r-v and 
51v-52r respectively. 
115 D.1.21.1pr. 
116 D.1.21.1.1. On the subject see T. Spagnuolo Vigorita, ‘Imperium mixtum. Ulpiano, Alessandro e la 
giurisdizione procuratoria’, in Index. Quaderni Camerti di Studi Romanistici 18 (1990), p. 113-166, esp. 
p. 125. 
117 Accursius, Digestum vetus, cit., ad D.2.1.3, § Mixtum, cols. 164-165. 
118 Bartolus de Sassoferrato, Super prima et secunda parte Digesti veteris, cit., ad D.1.21, §  Quecunque, 
n. 1-8, p. 101-102, and ad D.2.1.3, § Imperium, n. 1, p. 111-112. Bartolus' reading of the Accursian Gloss 
reduced even more the (already narrow) scope of iurisdictio delegata. Now, only the lowest kinds of 
imperium could be delegated to magistratus municipales: ibid., § Imperium, n. 12 and n. 21-22, p. 113. 
Not even the whole iurisdictio simplex (or rather, those kinds which could be heard by a iudex 
mercenarius: supra, note 10) could be delegated, but only the lower groups of its six-fold division: ibid., 
§ Imperium, n. 25-26, p. 113-114. 
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magistratus municipales, therefore, had neither merum nor mixtum imperium, so that 
'they could judge only about the lowest cases.'119 By the eve of the sixteenth century, 
the orthodox position had not changed among jurists. It was not possible to delegate to 
the magistratus civiles even those prerogatives which pertained to the iudex nobilis for 
the sake of private utility - let alone public.120 It may be recalled how legal humanists 
agreed with Alciatus in dismissing the distinction between iudex nobilis and 
mercenarius and that between private and public utility, as well as in relegating merum 
imperium to capital punishments. The assimilation of mixtum imperium with iurisdictio 
(or rather their inseparability) was the last step towards the full delegability of judicial 
prerogatives to lower magistrates.121 Also in this respect it was Longovallius who first 
brought Alciatus' arguments to their ultimate consequences: unlike merum, mixtum 
imperium may be fully delegated.122 For once, most of legal humanists wholeheartedly 
agreed.123 
                                                        
119 'Magistratus municipales cognoscunt de vilibus tantum causis', ibid., n. 1, p. 101. 
120 E.g. Jason de Mayno, Commentaria in primam partem Digesti veteris, Papiae, 1500, ad D.2.1.2, § 
Cui iurisdictio, and especially his ponderous lectura ad D.2.1.3, § Imperium. 
121 It is interesting to observe how the same statement of Paul (as reported by Papinian in D.1.21.1.1 - 
mixtum imperium may be delegated so long as instrumental to the exercise of iurisdictio) was the basis 
for two completely different interpretations. Of the two, perhaps the Commentators' one was more 
faithful to the text - though not entirely so. Moving from the Accursian Gloss, they looked at those 
aspects of mixtum imperium strictly instrumental to iurisdictio simplex. The obvious conclusion was that 
only a little part of the prerogatives of mixtum imperium could be delegated. Yet, when summing up their 
conclusions, they detached themselves from the text: the only prerogatives fully delegable were those of 
the iudex mercenarius. By contrast, legal humanists stressed the link between iurisdictio and mixtum 
imperium so to insist on the latter's full delegability. But, apart from Baro, they typically shunned the full 
assimilation of iurisdictio with mixtum imperium. As a consequence, they usually jumped to the 
conclusion that, since mixtum imperium contained the modica coercitio needed to exercise iurisdictio, it 
was fully delegable. Clearly, this leap forward entirely begged the question: does all mixtum imperium 
consist of modica coercitio instrumental to the exercise of iurisdictio? The answer was obviously 
negative. Hence, after having boldly stated that all mixtum imperium may be delegated (as iurisdictioni 
coaeherens), they hastily went back a step or two and identified some kinds of mixtum imperium totally 
unrelated to iurisdictio, singling them out as exceptions to the rule. A remarkable exception to this modus 
operandi, however, may be found in Donellus. To distinguish between the cases in which jurisdiction on 
private disputes could be delegated and those in which it could not, Donellus added a third category, an 
'intermedium genus iurisdictionis', to the usual contentious and non-contentious ones ('contentiosa' and 
'voluntaria' iurisdictio, on whose delegability see his Commentarii de iure civili, cit., lib. 17, ch. 8, n. 11-
12, cols. 1128-1129, and ch. 10, n. 9-12, cols. 1192-1197 respectively). While methodologically 
important, Donellus' third genus was of lesser practical relevance, consisting mainly in datio tutoris 
(ibid., ch. 8, n. 7, col. 1125, n. 14, col. 1132, and esp. ch. 9, n. 11, cols. 1174-1175), and three other 
somewhat minor prerogatives ('transactio alimentorum testamento relictorum; praediorum minoris 
alienatio; consilii exercitio', ibid., ch. 8, n. 17, cols. 1136-1137). Having thus excluded those prerogatives 
of mixtum imperium which had no connection with iurisdictio and could not therefore be delegated, 
Donellus then used an implied argumentum a contrario so to include in the delegable prerogatives also 
those with very loose connection with iurisdictio, such as praetoria stipulatio and missio in possessionem 
(ibid., ch. 8, n. 11, cols. 1128-1129). The point was perhaps worth mentioning in full because it seems 
to strengthen the centrality of the delegability of mixtum imperium in most of the legal humanists 
mentioned in this essay. Had it been just a peripheral point, they would have probably devoted less 
attention to it and possibly also avoided to structure their argument in such a dangerous way.  
122 Longovallius, Nova et facilis declaratio, cit., pt. 4, fols. 25v-26r and 30v-32r (on merum imperium), 
and ibid., fols. 24v-25r, 26v-27r and 28r-29v (on mixtum imperium). 
123 Loriotus, De iurisdictione et imperio, cit.,  axiomata 22 and 24, cols. 35-36, and axioma 31, col. 39; 
Goveanus, ad Legem III D. Imperium, De iurisdictione omnium iudicium, cit., p. 5-6, and De 
Iurisdictione libri II, adversus Eguinarium Baronem, cit., p. 23, 29, 40-41 and 44; Charondas, de 
iurisdictione et imperio libellius, cit., n. 18, fol. 55r-v, and esp. n. 25-26, fol. 63r; Donellus, Commentarii 
de iure civili, cit., lib. 17, esp. ch. 8, n. 6, cols. 1123-1124. Gillotus went even further, fully equating 
ordinary judges to higher ones given that they shared the same potestas iurisdictionis: Gillotus, De 
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At first sight, the whole debate might appear hardly relevant to contemporary issues. 
But if we look slightly beyond the Roman facade, the message was pretty clear. As 
openly stated by Baro with his usual bluntness, if iurisdictio is basse justice, mixtum 
imperium is moyenne justice and merum imperium is haute justice, it follows that local 
judges (magistratus municipales) enjoy not only basse, but also (and moreover) 
moyenne justice. 124  But in the sixteenth century none of the three categories 
corresponded perfectly to its Roman equivalent. In particular, haute justice was not 
coterminous with merum imperium but it was somewhat broader, encompassing also 
some prerogatives of Roman mixtum imperium. If local magistrates enjoyed mixtum 
imperium in full, then they would also have some prerogatives pertaining to haute 
justice.125 
 
If we look back at the main (and most quoted) defences of the Bartolian jurisdictional 
categories in the light of such observations, those apparently abstract (and abstruse) 
discussions might look quite different. Menochius’ insistence on the unity of imperium, 
which could be considered both as species and genus,126 was aimed at detaching mixtum 
imperium from iurisdictio. The more mixtum imperium was considered under the genus 
of imperium, the less it would have in common with iurisdictio. Far from being a 
dogmatic digression, Menochius’ theory had serious repercussions on the scope of 
delegated iurisdictio. Being two different categories, mixtum imperium was not merely 
instrumental to the exercise of iurisdictio. When iurisdictio was delegated, therefore, 
only a few prerogatives pertaining to mixtum imperium could accompany it.127 While 
studiously avoiding to state as much too openly, Menochius considerably narrowed the 
powers of the delegated judge in practice.128 Similarly, Bologneti's division between 
actio and persecutio allowed to distinguish fully mixtum imperium from iurisdictio.129 
                                                        
iurisdictione et imperio libri duo, cit., pt. 2, ch. 18, n. 1, fol. 14v. By contrast, Baro was somewhat more 
careful and attentive to the exact scope of D.1.21.1.1: Baro, Ad digesta iuris civilis l. de iurisdictione, 
cit., p. 144. Nonetheless he still overtly argued for the full delegability of mixtum imperium: ibid., p. 43, 
59, 66, 84, 139, 157, 162, and esp. 97-105 and 147-148. More cautious was (as usual) Corasius, who 
stated as much in a less overt way: Corasius, de iurisdictione et imperio, cit., n. 7-8, p. 276. 
124 Baro, Ad digesta iuris civilis l. de iurisdictione, cit., p. 162. See more broadly also ibid., p. 162-165. 
125 Id., Ad τα πρώτα Digestorum, cit., tit. 1, fol. 71r-v. 
126 Menochius, De imperio et iurisdictione commentarii, cit., lib. 1, ch. 7, n. 2, p. 85: ‘Hae opiniones; 
quae verbis, non sensu differunt, conciliari sic possunt. Mixtum imperium componitur ex Imperio, quod 
alias, dempta iurisdictione remanet merum, atque ita si consideratur, ut Imperium, sub nomine generis, 
dicitur simpliciter Imperium: si vero sub nomine speciei, dicitur sublata iurisdictione merum; adiecta 
autem iurisdictione appellatur mixtum. Et horum sententia mihi etiam probatur.’ 
127 Ibid., esp. lib. 1, ch. 24 (q. 17), n. 3 and 5-6, p. 180-183. 
128 The second - and considerably shorter - book of Menochius’ treatise is entirely devoted to the 
distinction between ordinaria and delegata iurisdictio (ibid., lib. 2, p. 193-214, esp. ch. 5, p. 201-205, 
ch. 8, p. 209-210, ch. 11, p. 212, and ch. 12, p. 212-214). The approach of Menochius is significantly 
restrictive on both nature and scope of the powers of the delegated judge (ibid., esp. ch. 4 [q. 4], n. 3-4 
and 6, p. 204-205; ch. 10 [q. 10], p. 211; ch. 11 [q. 11], p. 212). And yet he is conspicuously silent on 
the most debated issue, namely whether mixtum imperium may be delegated and, if so, whether it should 
automatically follow iurisdictio delegata (ibid., esp. ch. 13-15, p. 214-221, the obvious sedes materiae 
for such a discussion). The omission is all the more remarkable for two reasons. First, because Menochius 
was the only author dealing extensively with the subject to avoid the issue. Second, given that the 
omission itself was just partial, for immediately before he had clearly excluded the delegation of merum 
imperium (ibid., ch. 12 [q. 12], n. 1, p. 213-214), therefore begging the issue when it came to mixtum 
imperium, an omission so remarkable to appear voluntary, all the more given his insistence on the unitary 
nature of imperium.  
129 Bologneti, In primam Digesti veteris repetitiones, cit., n. 49, fol. 195v: 'imperium sit iurisdictio quae 
ex solo motu iudicis vel super persequtionibus (sic) expeditur, et verbum persecutionibus ponit 
differentiam cum iurisdictione quae expeditur solum super actionibus quae sunt ius formatum in iure 
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It followed that mixtum imperium was not (to borrow a theological term) 
'consubstantial' with iurisdictio: their substantia was different, both on a procedural 
level and on a theoretical one. As such, and crucially, mixtum imperium did not follow 
iurisdictio, and when iurisdictio was delegated mixtum imperium was not. 130 
Ultimately, Bologneti's three-fold division of both iurisdictio and imperium 
(legislative, jurisdictional and equitable) was aimed at structurally preventing any issue 
on delegation, for the very power to delegate (potestas delegandi) did not pertain to 
judicial iurisdictio (iurisdictio iudiciaria), but rather to equitable iurisdictio (iurisdictio 
gratiosa).131 Delegating iurisdictio was therefore a matter way beyond the reach of 
ordinary judges. 132  By the same token, the apparently specious classifications of 
Obrecht - opposing the notio of iurisdictio to the potestas of imperium, stressing the 
unity of imperium and dividing the prerogatives of mixtum imperium according to their 
instrumentality to the exercise of iurisdictio - were in fact aimed at detaching mixtum 
imperium from iurisdictio, so to narrow as much as possible the prerogatives pertaining 
to mixtum imperium which could be delegated together with iurisdictio. 133  Even 
Bocerus’ division between iurisdictio ordinaria and specialis (or extraordinaria) 
allowed him to keep the vast majority of prerogatives pertaining to mixtum imperium 
away from iurisdictio, and therefore to prevent their delegability.134 In short, far from 
being convoluted byzantinisms, such re-classifications of the Bartolian scheme were in 
fact a set of counter-measures to avoid the institutional devolution of mixtum imperium 
to lower judges.  
 
 
Even if we were to conclude, as any sensible scholar is apparently expected to, that 
legal humanism was a renaissance of legal culture, selflessly aiming to restore the purity 
of Roman law for its own sake, some doubts might still linger. Here, we have briefly 
glimpsed two in particular. Firstly, the effect of those learned observations was 
                                                        
consistenti.' Ibid., n. 91, fols. 203v-204r: '[mixtum imperium] mixtura consideratur quia ab imperio capit 
quod ab authoritate dependet, et non fundatur in iure partis principaliter, et a iurisdictione capit quod 
consistat in causis civilibus. Et ex ista mixtura causantur postea persequtiones (sic) quae sunt medium 
inter actiones et imperium merum'. 
130 Ibid., n. 16, fols. 188v-189r; cf. also n. 91, fol. 204r. 
131 Ibid., n. 32, fol. 191r. 
132 Ibid., n. 43-44, fols. 193v-194v. Cf. also n. 85, fol. 202r. To be safe, Bologneti used the division 
between actio and persecutio to prevent the other possible way to broaden the scope of the jurisdiction 
of lower judges: the appeal. On the subject, the common understanding was that the competence to hear 
appellate cases depended on the subject matter. As the court of appeal would hear the same controversy 
discussed before that of first instance, it did not need broader competences. So, if the subject matter fell 
within the scope of iurisdictio, then (at least in principle) the appellate judge did not need imperium. To 
prevent a delegated judge from being entrusted with the appeal, Bologneti looked at the act of appealing 
(admissio appellationis) and considered it to be beyond the scope of actio (i.e. iurisdictio) and so within 
that of persecutio (typically, civilis), hence requiring mixtum imperium. Since lower judges neither had 
mixtum imperium nor could receive it (by delegation), it followed that they could not hear any appeal 
either. Ibid., esp. n. 101, fol. 206r. 
133 Obrecht, Disputatio de Iurisdictionis et Imperii Principiis, cit., theses 227 and 370. Further, the 
distinction between notio and potestas allowed Obrecht to insist on the instrumentality of iurisdictio to 
imperium mixtum and not vice-versa, as most legal humanists held: ibid., thesis 322. 
134 Bocerus, Disputatio de iurisdictione, cit., n. 3 let. b, p. 3, and n. 5, let. a-b, p. 4. Once excluded the 
delegability of the largest part of mixtum imperium, Bocerus happily agreed with legal humanists on the 
instrumentality of coercitio to iurisdictio and its delegability, in a crescendo of lip-service (ibid., esp. n. 
10, let. a-b, p. 7-8, n. 12, let. a-f, p. 9-12, n. 13, let. a-g, p. 12-14). Among the (many) other authors who 
did substantially as much see e.g. Borrello, De Magistratuum edictis, cit., lib. 1, ch. 1, n. 114, p. 26-27, 
and Vulteius, Commentarius at tit. Codicis, cit., ad C.3.13, n. 84, p. 50, n. 91, p. 52. 
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potentially of momentous impact. For their target was a stratified system build on the 
Accursian Gloss and its Bartolian interpretation, a centuries-old system ultimately still 
stemming from the very trunk which the humanist jurists were trying so industriously 
to fell. Secondly, and more specifically, many attacks of legal humanists often had a 
centrifugal purpose, for they targeted the judicial structure of centralised power.  
Even so, all this remains speculation. It is of course possible that all the above debate 
was a genuine protest led by erudite and accomplished scholars against the great 
liberties the Bartolists had taken in respect to the Roman texts. And that Civilians were 
just indulging in tedious, useless and abstract speculations - their speciality, after all. 
Divesting imperium of any legislative and authoritiative meaning might appear a harsh 
attack on a political level, but it may well be a coincidence that the same arguments 
were pushed to their extreme consequences shortly thereafter by those legal humanists 
often known as Monarchomacs. Similarly, the fact that the largest portion of nearly all 
humanistic treatises on our subject focused on delegated jurisdiction and implied the 
effective freedom of lower tribunals from Royal courts could just be an over-analysis. 
After all, no Kulturkampf has ever had political ends. 
 
 
